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Hardy and Secrest: Religious Freedom and the Federal Communications Commission

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
ASHTON R. HARDY*
LAWRENCE W. SECREST III**t

The efforts of religious broadcasters to operate broadcasting stations according to the tenets of their faiths have, at times, collided
with the secular duties imposed by the acceptance of a broadcasting
license. Religious broadcasters who feel a duty to speak out on contemporary issues or the immutable truths of faith have questioned the requirements for "fairness," "equal time," or for hiring practices which
forbid, in some instances, employment only of adherents to particular
doctrines. And yet, the collision is unavoidable so long as competing
views are allowed in a free marketplace of ideas and the number of
available broadcast frequencies are fewer than those seeking a radio
or television outlet.
Commercial broadcasters have accepted the plethora of government regulations and requirements, though often with reluctance, as a
cost of doing business; but some religious broadcasters view these
same regulations as stifling religious expression and forcing them into
compromising positions. The Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"), which regulates the air waves and grants licenses for their
use, has grappled often with the competing interests of the religious
broadcaster's intended use of a frequency to advance a theology and
the government's desire for uniform application of its rules and
policies. In the opinion of some religious broadcasters, these rules
and policies have the effect of restraining the uninhibited exercise
of religious expression.
The Commission's "Fairness Doctrine," for example, requires all
broadcasters, religious and secular, that air one side of a "controversial is'sue of public importance" to provide a fair presentation of opposing views within their overall programming. On its face, nothing could
* Partner in Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carr~re & Den6gre, New
Orleans, Louisiana; formerly General Counsel to the Federal Communications Commission.
**
Partner in Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, D.C.; formerly Deputy General
Counsel to the Federal Communications Commission.
t The authors acknowledge that they are deeply indebted to Dennis
Kahane, Associate of Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent Carr(re & Den6gre, New
Orleans, Louisiana, formerly Attorney-Advisor to the Broadcast Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, and John S. Logan, Associate of Kirkland & Ellis,
Washington, D.C., for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
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appear to be fairer: the policy is designed to facilitate the robust
debate on the urgent issues that emerge among citizens living in a free
society. In practice, however, many commercial broadcasters minimize
the airing of ideas or commentaries that would impose Fairness Doctrine obligations upon them, and the FCC has seldom enforced the component of the Fairness Doctrine that requires a broadcaster to initiate
coverage of public issues. In contrast, religious broadcasters whose
very purpose in broadcasting is to disseminate their views on God and
society, seldom shirk from their responsibilities to inform the community of both transitory and eternal concerns, and, thus, they become
obligated to broadcast the conflicting opinions of those with views that
may be diametrically opposed to their faith. Chief Judge Bazelon, of
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, addressed this
very issue in his dissenting opinion in the famous Brandywine case,'
and concluded that "[tihe ratio of 'reply time' required for every issue
discussed [would force the religious broadcaster] to censor its
views-to decrease the number of issues it discussed, or to decrease
the intensity of its presentation."2 According to Judge Bazelon, "[e]ase
of administration is of no weight in this field where precious constitutional freedoms hang in the balance."'
Unquestionably, religious broadcasters zealously seek to protect
their liberties, and their broadcasts are not lost in the ether to an
unlistening populace. By way of example, consider the petition filed by
Jeremy D. Lansman and Lorenzo W. Milam, in December 1974, requesting that the FCC "freeze" applications by religious institutions
for TV or FM channels reserved for educational stations. This petition,
which did not concern religious broadcasters on commercial frequencies where the bulk of religious programming is to be found, was
unanimously denied by the Commission on August 1, 1975. During the
eighteen months following the Commission's denial of the petition,
more than five million letters' poured into the Commission, written by
Americans who, misunderstanding the petition and the Commission's
action, protested what they believed was a plan to ban religious broad1. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973) (affirming the denial of renewal of license to Dr. Carl
McIntire).
2. Id., 473 F.2d at 70.
3. Id.
4. At last count, over 11 million letters have arrived at the Commission addressed to this issue and they continue to be sent by misinformed citizens who believe
the government is considering taking religious broadcast programs off the air in a proceeding they believe was begun by the famous atheist Madelyn Murray O'Hair.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss1/2

Hardy and Secrest: Religious Freedom and the Federal Communications Commission
1981]

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

59

casting. During 1977, the Washington Post reported than an average
of 8,000 letters per day were arriving at the FCC in opposition to
the already denied petition.'
Religious broadcasters do not form a monolithic entity. They are
as diverse in their opinions and programming as is the American religious community. A listener can, with a sweep of his dial, go from high
church to evangelical, from a mass to a revival. The religious institutions operating these stations are not all of one mind or one message.
The very diversity of the American religious scene protects the
public's interest in the ability to hear alternative viewpoints.
The religious broadcaster faces some unique problems. In some
cases, it is difficult for outsiders to agree to classify his institution as
"educational" and thus qualified for an educational reserved FM channel. Then there is the question as to what is a religious educational
"institution": need it be only a church, or must it have an affiliated
educational facility? The unique problem of fund-raising by religious
broadcasters and the desire by some churches to employ only individuals adhering to their doctrines have created singular problems
at the FCC as well.
As one reads through the Commission decisions, a governmental
bias disfavorable to the religious broadcaster will not jump from the
opinions. Taken case-by-case, each reported decision may appear
reasonable when read with the view that insofar as their broadcast
licenses are concerned, religious broadcasters are no different from
any other broadcaster. If one should accept this proposition as axiomatic, then the case decisions may appear logical and unflawed. But
religious broadcasters are indeed different from secular commercial
broadcasters and are properly endowed with religious protections
guaranteed by the Constitution, protections no less valid now in our
electronic age than they were when the Bill of Rights was adopted in
the early days of our republic.
When one abandons a case-by-case review and examines the
totality of the record, it becomes apparent that some policies, though
on their face equally applicable to secular broadcasters, have a
disproportionately harsh impact on religious broadcasters. In addition,
apart from published policies, discrimination can take many forms
such as the intolerably long wait some religious broadcasters have
faced when filing applications with the Commission.
5.

Washington Post, February 17, 1977, at A-16.
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THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING

The Red Lion' case has long been recognized as one of the United
States Supreme Court's most significant pronouncements in the area
of broadcast law. In Red Lion, the Court upheld as constitutional
Federal Communications Commission regulations relating to the
broadcast of "personal attacks" and political editorials which had been
adopted by the FCC to implement its Fairness Doctrine. In its decision,
the Court concluded that these Fairness Doctrine regulations enhanced rather than infringed upon the freedoms of speech and press
protected under the First Amendment and thus the Court applied to
broadcasting a theory of First Amendment free speech analysis that
has never been applied to the conventional press.
The case arose at Radio Station WGCB, licensed to the Red Lion
Broadcasting Company. WGCB, on November 27, 1964, broadcast a
15-minute commentary by the Reverend Billy James Hargis as part of
a series entitled "Christian Crusade." Hargis discussed at length a
book entitled "Goldwater-Extremist on the Right," by Fred J. Cook.
In the broadcast, Hargis said that author Cook had been fired by a
newspaper for making false charges against city officials, that he had
worked for a communist-affiliated publication, that he had defended
Alger Hiss and attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the Central Intelligence
Agency, and that his book had been written to "smear and destroy,
Barry Goldwater." Cook heard the broadcast and demanded free time
pursuant to the Commission's personal attack rule. Station WGCB
refused his request.
Following a complaint by Cook, the FCC concluded that the
Hargis broadcast did constitute a personal attack on Cook, and that
Red Lion had failed to meet its obligations under the Fairness Doctrine. In response to Red Lion's arguments concerning its First
Amendment liberties, the Supreme Court held:
It does not violate the First Amendment to treat
licensees given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obligated to give
suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern. To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a
willingness to present representative community views on
controversial issues is consistent with the ends and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the
abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
6.

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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Congress need not stand idly by and permit those with
licenses to ignore the problems which beset the people or to
exclude from the airways anything but their own views of
fundamental questions.7
The Red Lion case was born at a religious broadcast station, but,
though a landmark holding in media law, it is not of singular interest to
religious broadcasters, as it contains no discussion of religious broadcasting as distinguished from secular broadcasting.
For the religious broadcaster, the Brandywine-Main Line' case,
decided by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, stands as
one of the major cases. This case had its genesis in 1964 when Radio
Station WVCH in Chester, Pennsylvania determined to cease broadcasting Dr. Carl McIntire's "Twentieth Century Reformation Hour."
In order to provide for a media outlet in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania area, Dr. McIntire's Faith Theological Seminary negotiated
for the purchase of Radio Stations WXUR and WXUR-FM at Media,
Pennsylvania. In its application to the Commission, the seminary
proposed continuing WXUR and WXUR-FM's general format of broadcasting entertainment, talk shows and short newcasts, and in addition
two one-hour religious programs each weekday as well as religious
programs until noon on Sunday. The seminary stated in its application
that it sought the broadcast license "for the principle purpose of broadcasting the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, for the
defense of the Gospel, and for the purposes set forth in the Charter of
Incorporation." 9 Oppositions to the seminary's application were filed
by some fifteen community groups including a number of individuals
and churches located within the community. In response to some of
these oppositions the seminary stated its intent to "'make time
available on an equal and non-discriminatory basis to all religious
faiths requesting time for the presentation of religious programs.' 0
The Commission granted the seminary's application for transfer
of the stations on March 19, 1965, but went to great lengths in its decision to reiterate the seminary's duties and obligations under both the
Fairness Doctrine and the Personal Attack Rule. The Commission
stated specifically: "In reaching this determination, we have relied
upon the specific representations by the transferee indicating
7. Id., 395 U.S. at 394.
8. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973).
9. Id., 473 F.2d at 20.
10. Id. at 21.
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awareness of a licensee's responsibilities. In any event, this grant is
subject to the same conditions applicable to all broadcast grants ...[including, among itemized conditions] ... that [Brandywine] will abide by
the requirements of the Fairness Doctrine."'" The seminary took over
responsibilities as the new licensee and began broadcast operations on
April 29, 1965.
The new licensee lost no time in making substantial changes in
the station's program format and began broadcasting programs having
little relationship to those proposed in the transfer application. In the
words of the court: "All of these programs shared one common characteristic: they were devoted almost solely to coverage and discussion of
viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance. Personal attacks on the honesty, integrity, and character of both groups and in2
dividuals were, unfortunately, not infrequent." 1
Only seven months after the seminary took over the operation of
station WXUR, the Media Borough Council and the Pennsylvania
General Assembly's House of Representatives voted a public condemnation of the station. Thereafter WXUR began broadcasting a program called "Interfaith Dialogue," a program which the seminary had
promised in its transfer application, but which had been delayed in its
initial appearance until after the condemnation.
The Commission's approval of Brandywine's transfer to the
seminary provided the new owners with an initial license term running
only until August 1, 1966. Thus, within one year and three months
after the seminary took over the operation of the stations, the Commission designated the renewal applications for hearing to determine
whether the applicant had fully and candidly advised the Commission
of its program plans in connection with the transfer application and
whether the applicant had complied with the Commission's Fairness
Doctrine and the Personal Attack principle. The Commission also
designated an issue as to whether the applicant had used the facilities
of the station to serve its sectarian and political views and to raise
funds for their support rather than to serve the community generally,
and whether this constituted a misrepresentation to the Commission
in the original transfer application.
Hearings were held in Media, Pennsylvania beginning on October
2, 1967, and the record was not closed until June 26, 1968, after a more
than 8,000-page record and several hundred exhibits had been com11.
12.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
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piled. The court, in a footnote in its decision, publicly censored Brandywine's counsel, who the court called "injudicious, rude, impudent
and directly obstructive to the proceedings before the examiner," and
stated that the record before the court was "replete with one instance
3
after another of obstreperous behavior on Mr. Cottone's part."'1
While the Hearing Examiner's Initial Opinion would have
granted the renewal to Brandywine, the Commission refused to adopt
his opinion, and concluded, "that Brandywine under its new ownership
did not make reasonable efforts to comply with the Fairness Doctrine
during the license period."' 4 The Commission stated,
We are not concerned with the social, political, or religious
philosophy of the licensee or any person using its facilities.
Our interest is in the right of the public to a reasonable
opportunity to hear contrasting views on controversial
issues; whether this right has been accorded by the licensee
can be determined only in the context of issues, not by
generalized political labels. In the face of particular attention being drawn to the necessity for fairness at the time
control of the station was transferred, the record shows no
reasonable attempt to meet the station's obligations in this
15
area.
The Commission found that during the seminary's stewardship of
WXUR, Brandywine had failed to give required notice to parties attacked, had failed to send required copies of transcripts, tapes or summaries, and, similarly, had failed to offer opportunities to aggrieved
parties to reply as required.
The Commission stated that an independent basis for denying the
Brandywine renewal application was that the station had failed to live
up to its original representations concerning programming. The Commission specifically found that the program "Interfaith Forum," on
which the seminary had heavily relied in the transfer application, did
not appear until ten days after the Media Borough Council's resolution,
and that the show, once begun, was not the interfaith round table
discussion that had been promised, but rather an interview show on
which students or faculty of the Faith Theological Seminary interviewed fellow seminarians. The Commission also found that in the first
nine days after control of Brandywine was transferred to the seminary
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 27, n.39.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1981], Art. 2
64

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16

on April 29, 1965, WXUR had replaced a number of promised entertainment programs with seven new nonentertainment programs, and
that "logic dictates . . .that 6the plans for each of these programs
predated the actual transfer."'
The D.C. Circuit concluded that the record of Brandywine was
"bleak in the area of good faith," and that "at best, Brandywine's
record is indicative of a lack of regard for fairness principles; at worst,
it shows an utter disdain for Commission rulings and ignores its own
responsibilities as a broadcaster and its representations to the Commission."17 The court determined that "during the entire license period
Brandywine willfully chose to disregard Commission mandate," and
that "[w]ith more brazen bravado than brains, Brandywine went on an
independent frolic broadcasting what it chose, in any terms it chose,
abusing those who dared differ with its viewpoints."' 8 The court concluded that, "[sluch maneuvering has proven to be not so wise
gamesmanship on the part of a licensee. Brandywine's abuses in this
area are so blatant as to be sufficient to shock the conscience of the
court."1
The Court stated that the "most disturbing"20 aspect of this case
was not the Fairness Doctrine violations, but Brandywine's program
misrepresentations. The changes which took place within the very
first few days following the WXUR transfer "show a common design
on the part of the licensee to engage in deceit and trickery in obtaining
a broadcast license. 21 "Brandywine sought through subterfuge to gain
its license and then proceed to broadcast the type of material it believed to be most suitable-the type of material that would forward
the ends of the fundamentalist movement-in utter disregard for
either the public or their earlier representations to the Commission. ' 22
The court continued:
This is a case in which the blind need for a radio outlet in the
Philadelphia market has led men experienced in the broadcast industry to misrepresent the facts and to attempt to
deceive a regulatory body all to a single end-propagation
on the media of their philosophic dogma. These men may
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

34.
46-47.
47.
50.
51.
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have possessed the highest aims for their cause but these
aims were blind to the needs of the general public. Misrepresentations conceived to win a soap-box from which to
shout one's views are the basest overexaggeration of the
liberties guaranteed in the first amendment.23
The opinion stressed the corollary rights of the public:
Since the airwaves are a scarce commodity and have been
deemed a public trust it is easy for us to see that Dr. McIntire and his followers have every right for their views to be
broadcast. Their right to operate a radio station is no different from the rights of any other group in America. Their
rights are neither superior nor inferior. In seeking a broad-'
cast station they had to meet the same requirements as
anyone else seeking a license. The first of these requirements is candor and honesty in representations to the Commission. Their dismal failure in this regard is evidenced by
this 8,000 page record. These men, with their hearts bent
toward deliberate and premeditated deception, cannot be
said to have dealt fairly with the Commission or the people
in the Philadelphia area. Their statements constitute a
series of heinous misrepresentations which, even without
the other factors in this case, would be ample justification
for the Commission to refuse to renew the broadcast
license.24
Chief Judge Bazelon, who dissented from the Court's opinion in
5 stated, "if we are to go after gnats with a sledgehammer
Brandywine,"
like the fairness doctrine, we ought at least to look at what else is
smashed beneath our blow."2 The Chief Judge's separate opinion
found that the determination not to renew the WXUR license had
"dealt a death blow to the licensee's freedoms of speech and press." 7
Furthermore, he continued, "silencing WXUR... has denied the listening public access to the expression of many controversial views. Yet,
the Commission," he wrote, "would have us approve this action in the
name of the fairness doctrine, the constitutional validity of which is
premised on the argument that its enforcement will enhance public

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

51-52.
52.
63.
64.
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access to a marketplace of ideas without serious infringement of the
First Amendment rights of individual broadcasters."28
While WXUR was undoubtly devoted to a particular religious
and political philosophy, Judge Bazelon concluded, "[I]t was also a
radio station devoted to speaking out and stirring debate on controversial issues. The station," he continued, "was purchased by Faith
Theological Seminary to propagate a viewpoint which was not being
heard in the greater Philadelphia area." 9 Removing WXUR from the
air, the dissenting opinion stated, "has deprived the listening public
not only of a viewpoint but also of robust debate on innumerable controversial issues. It is beyond dispute that the public has lost access to
information and ideas. This is not a loss to be taken lightly, however
unpopular or disruptive we might judge these ideas to be.""0
Taking serious issue with the constitutionality of the Fairness
Doctrine, the Chief Judge wrote that, "even if WXUR had not been
removed from the air but simply ordered to comply with the FCC's ruling, the effect would have been strangulation."3 The application of the
Fairness Doctrine to WXUR, the Chief Judge opined, "would have
forced WXUR to censor its views," because of the ratio of reply time
required for every issue discussed on the station.2 Chief Judge
Bazelon concluded, "The ramifications of this chilling effect will be felt
by every broadcaster who simply has a lot to say."33
Both the Red Lion and Brandywine cases are of significance to
religious broadcasters because the Fairness Doctrine and Personal Attack rules, while fully applicable to all broadcasters, have a special
impact on the religious broadcaster. Secular broadcasters may avoid
Fairness Doctrine complications by eliminating any controversial programming, or by reducing discussions of issues to a milquetoast
review. The religious broadcaster, however, has as his raison d'etre,
the obligation to speak out on contemporary moral issues and the
constant truths as seen through his faith. Thus it is on the shoulders of
the religious broadcaster that the full weight of the Fairness Doctrine
falls. The Fairness Doctrine, which applies prima facie to all broadcasters, has its greatest effect on religious broadcasters.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 63-64 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 69 (citations omitted).
Id. at 70 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Lest this discussion be misunderstood, it is clear that there are
many instances of Fairness Doctrine violations by secular broadcasters and the networks. No broadcaster is exempt from the Fairness
Doctrine, and all must be constantly and keenly aware of its impact
and requirements. But being aware of its Fairness obligations, the
typical commercial broadcaster can avoid potential problems by
limiting to a bare minimum his controversial issues; most religious
broadcasters cannot and will not be muzzled in their exercise of their
religious freedom to discuss issues and the answers found in their
faiths. 4
34. The Fairness Doctrine merely codified existing and longstanding fairness
obligations. One of the early cases on point is Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. Federal
Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir., 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). The
Radio Commission, a forerunner to the present FCC, had designated Trinity
Methodist's renewal application for hearing, based on a pattern of broadcast attacks by
the church's minister, the Reverend Doctor Shuler. Dr. Shuler had charged particular
California judges with "sundry immoral acts;" he had made "defamatory statements
against the board of health;" he had charged that one labor temple in Los Angeles was
"a bootlegging and gambling joint;" he alluded "slightingly" to Jews and "made frequent and bitter attacks on the Roman Catholic religion." He once broadcast that he
had "certain damaging information against a prominent unnamed man, which, unless a
contribution (presumably to the church) of a hundred dollars was forthcoming, he
would disclose. As a result, he received contributions from several persons." Id. at 852.
Dr. Shuler had twice "been convicted of attempting in his radio talks to obstruct the
orderly administration of public justice." Id. at 851. The Court affirmed the Commission's decision not to renew the station's license. The court stated:
If it be considered that one in possession of a permit to broadcast in interstate commerce may, without let or hindrance from any source, use
these facilities, reaching out, as they do, from one corner of the country
to the other, to obstruct the administration of justice, offend the religious
susceptibilities of thousands, inspire political distrust and civic discord, or
offend youth and innocence by the free use of words suggestive of sexual
immorality, and be answerable for slander only at the instance of the one
offended, then this great science, instead of a boon, will become a scourge,
and the nation a theater for the display of individual passions and the collision of personal interests. This is neither censorship nor previous
restraint, nor is it a whittling away of the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment, or an impairment of their free exercise. Appellant may continue to indulge his strictures upon the characters of men in public office.
He may just as freely as ever criticize religious practices of which he does
not approve. He may even indulge private malice of personal
slander-subject, of course, to be required to answer for the abuse
thereof-but he may not, as we think, demand, of right, the continued use
of an instrumentality of commerce for such purposes, or any other, except
in subordination to all reasonable rules and regulations Congress, acting
through the Commission, may prescribe.
Id. at 852-53.
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CIVIL

RIGHTS AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY:
THE IMPACT ON RELIGIOUS BROADCASTERS

Another area of great concern to religious broadcasters relates to
their hiring practices, a matter that was examined by the D.C. Circuit
in a case known as The King's Garden, Inc.35 The FCC had found that
King's Garden, licensee of radio station KBIQ-FM and KGDN in
Edmonds, Washington had discriminated on religious grounds in its
employment practices. King's Garden, relying upon a 1972 Amendment to a 1964 Civil Rights Act, claimed exemption as a religious entity from the Act's ban on religious discrimination in employment.
While FCC regulations exempted employment "'connected with the
espousal of the licensee's religious views,' "3 King's Garden believed
the 1972 Amendment allowed it to discriminate on religious grounds in
all of its employment practices. The Court, stating that the 1972
exemption was of "very doubtful constitutionality, 3' 7 found that the
exemption "invites religious groups, and them alone, to impress a test
of faith on job categories, and indeed whole enterprises, having
nothing to do with the exercise of religion."38
Judge J. Skelly Wright, writing for the court, noted that King's
Garden readily conceded that it was obligated to adhere to the
Fairness and Personal Attack rules of the Commission, and said that:
King's Garden wishes us to assume that Congress now
regards sectarian broadcasters as regulable "public
trustees" so far as programming is concerned but as "institutions of God" untouchable by "the hands of Caesar" so
far as employment practices are concerned. We would require a sentence or two of pertinent legislative history
39
before crediting Congress with so bizarre a notion.
The court found this argument "defective," reasoning that, "[a]
religious sect has no constitutional right to convert a licensed communications franchise into a church. A religious group, like any other,
may buy and operate a licensed radio or television station. But, like
any other group, a religious sect takes its franchise 'burdened by enforceable public obligations.' 0 According to the court, the Commis35.
996 (1974).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 53.
at 55.
at 59.
at 60 (citations omitted).
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sion's role in drawing lines between the secular and religious aspects
of broadcast operations was a difficult and delicate task, but "one
which the First Amendment thrusts upon every public body which has
dealings with religious organizations."41
Chief Judge Bazelon wrote a separate short decision concurring
with the court, 2 and stated that the 1972 amendments to the Civil
Rights Act would normally be superior to the Commission's Equal
Employment Opportunity rules, and would thus completely exempt
religious organizations from the Civil Rights Acts' ban on religious
discrimination. However, Chief Judge Bazelon viewed the amendment
as a violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment, and
stated his belief that the exemption was therefore unconstitutional
and not binding on the FCC.
The Commission elaborated on its King's Garden views in a
declaratory ruling for the National Religious Broadcasters, Inc. 3 The
Commission held that writers and research assistants hired for the
preparation of programs discussing a licensee's religioui news and persons hired to answer religious questions on call-in programs were
exempt from the non-discrimination rules. On the other hand, the Commission said there was no reason why an announcer must be of a particular faith in order to introduce a program or insert news, commercial announcements, or station identifications during or adjacent to
any program. In a footnote to the ruling the Commission stated that it
was not dealing with a particular person's title but with his function.
Thus, the Commission said a secretary does not become exempt from
the non-discrimination rules by changing his or her title to writer or
research assistant.
Another case involving a religious licensee's employment and
programming practices arose in connection with the purchase of station KRON-FM in San Francisco by the Mormon Church." In this instance the assignee, Bay Area Broadcasting Company, was totally
owned by Bonneville International Corporation, which in turn was
totally owned by Deseret Management Corporation which in turn was
totally owned by the Corporation of the President of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, the Mormon Church. The Commun41. Id. at 61.
42. Id.
43. In Re Request of Nat'l Religious Broadcasters, Inc. for a Declaratory Ruling, 43 F.C.C.2d 451 (1973).
44. In Re Chronicle Broadcasting Co. and Bay Area Broadcasting Co., 59
F.C.C.2d 335 (1976).
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ity Coalition for Media Change filed a petition seeking to block the
assignment of KRON-FM to the Mormons on the gound that the doctrines of the Mormon Church professed that Blacks and women were
inferior and that these doctrines had prevented the church from providing Blacks and women with the same treatment in employment
practices that it provided to white males. The Community Coalition
contended that both the businesses and social practices of the Mormon
Church and its subsidiaries had demonstrated that these doctrines of
inferiority were followed by corporations owned and controlled by the
Mormon Church. The petitioner further claimed that while the Mormon Church had changed from its former position to accept Blacks as
members of the church, it still prevented Blacks or women from entering the two priesthoods from which the elders who control the church
were chosen. The petitioner further contended that since twelve white
males in effect controlled all the corporations and businesses of the
Mormon Church, it was not possible for the church to comply with the
Commission's Equal Employment Opportunity requirements.
The assignee, Bay Area Broadcasting Company, stated that, contrary to the petitioner's contentions, it was the policy of the Mormon
Church "that it is morally evil to deny anyone the right to employment, full educational opportunity, or any privilege of citizenship.""
Further, it stated that it and its parent corporation, Bonneville International Corporation, were "'committed to meeting not only the
regulations of the FCC relating to equal employment but to all applicable equal employment policy requirements promulgated by the
United States Government.' ""
In its memorandum and opinion in order, the Commission stated
that:
[als concerns assignee, the Mormon Church, and its other
subsidiary corporations, we emphasize that the Commission's regulatory authority does not extend to an examination of their religious beliefs. In other words, we do not consider as relevant to our determination the religious beliefs
of any faith. We do consider as relevant those allegations
relating to the non-religious practices of the Church and its
subsidiaries and whether any of these entities can comply
with Commission Rules and policies pertaining to broadcast
licensees."
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 339 (citations omitted).
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The Commission, without further elaboration, found that the petitioner had failed to support its contentions that the church followed a
doctrine of Black and female inferiority in its business and social practices, and denied the petition and concurrently granted the application.
Do religious broadcasters have an absolute need to have
employees who have accepted the faith and who can act as proper
spokespersons? The Commission says certain employees are exempt
and others are not. We are given examples: a writer is exempt, a
secretary is not. Yet, often such neat categorization of job duties may
not be possible in the typical religious broadcast station, which is
usually a small operation with limited employees doing whatever tasks
are necessary. Can a secretary, of a different faith, hired in compliance
with the rules, be expected to perform fully and to stay at the job with
the knowledge that she cannot be promoted to be a researcher or
writer because of theological differences? Discrimination is not only
against the law, it is against the best interests of society. But we do
allow for exemptions. Chinese restaurants can, upon application (virtually always granted) to the Department of Labor, be allowed to hire
only Chinese help. It is presumed necessary that all the waiters be able
to speak to the chef. Religious broadcasters are much in the same position. In dishing up an assortment of music and talk, the recipe must
truly be reflective of the views and values of the particular faith. A
salesman, for instance, might sell beer advertising before he learns
that his employer frowns on alcohol.
In this regard, it is perhaps useful to distinguish between broadcasters who happen to have chosen a religious format in a commercial
decision, and those who program according to the tenets of their faith.
In this latter case, which is the usual situation, an established church
group forms or purchases a radio station with the purpose of disseminating its views as seen through its faith. Is it not unrealistic and unworkable to require the church to hire members of other faiths,
unbelievers, disbelievers, agnostics, and atheists, to aid in this mission?
Another matter involving the Mormon Church concerned the
renewal of the license of station KIRO-TV in Seattle, Washington." A
petition to deny the renewal application, treated as an informal objection because of procedural irregularities in the petition, had been filed
by the Citizens Institute, a community group in the Puget Sound Basin

48.

In Re KIRO, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 86 (1976).
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area. In its petition, Citizens Institute alleged that KIRO-TV had
abused its facilities by "purveying favorable propaganda about,
and/or proselytizing for, the Mormon Church, KIRO-TV's ultimate
corporate owner, in direct violation of both the Establishment and
Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States." The petitioner further alleged that KIRO-TV
had biased its news programming in favor of the religious and social
views of the Mormon Church for local standards of taste and appropriateness.
Again, the Commission dismissed the petitioner's allegations
finding that Citizens Institute had failed to present any substantial
evidence that the Mormon programs were not in the public interest,
and rejected the petitioner's contentions that because Mormons were
a minority in the Seattle, Washington area, the station's programs
could not be in the public interest. The Commission specifically accepted that KIRO-TV had broadcast numerous programs by various
denominations on both a paid and non-paid basis and in a nondiscriminatory fashion, and found this evidence to refute the petitioner's
allegations.
These two Mormon church cases point up, most clearly, the difficulties faced not only by religious broadcasters whose doctrines conflict with licensee responsibilities, but by the Commission in its
attempt to tread lightly on the dividing line beween religious freedom
and governmental regulation. In this last case, the Commission accomplished this goal by avoiding any finding concerning whether the
Mormons had used the station for "purveying favorable propaganda
about, and/or proselytizing for, the Mormon Church ... ,, Instead, the
Commission sought not to reach this very difficult constitutional issue
by finding merely that the petitioner had failed to make its case. The
Commission essentially disposed of the earlier Mormon Church case on
similar grounds, gingerly side-stepping the question whether the
racial and gender discrimination necessary for elevation to the
church's leadership impacted on its licensee responsibilities, and
found, instead, that the petitioner had failed to support its contentions.
But while the Commission will avoid any head-on collision with a major, established church, this immunity does not appear to follow in its
dealings with smaller church groups. The question is raised whether a
totally different disposition would have resulted in Red Lion and Brandywine had major churches been involved. If this is so, then it is not
the First Amendment that protects religious broadcasters, but
political considerations.
49.

Id. at 86-87.
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In 1976, the Commission granted an application assigning the
license for station KVDO-TV in Salem, Oregon to the Oregon State
Board of Higher Education.' A petition for reconsideration was filed
by Intercontinental Ministries, Inc., an organization that stated that it
was devoted primarily to religious work and goals, was interdenominational in scope and interest, and represented the Christian community
in the Salem, Oregon area. Among the petitioner's contentions was
that the State of Oregon, consistent with the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, was prohibited from broadcasting
religious programs as had been proposed in the application for assignment of license. The petitioner claimed that the Commission had erred
in stating that" 'the State of Oregon ...like any other applicant is subject to no constitutional objections which would constitute a bar to a
grant of its application.'
Upon reconsideration the Commission stated,
[w]e believe it is clear that if the State of Oregon were to
propose programming for the advancement or inhibition of
religion, then such could be circumscribed by the Constitution. (Citation omitted.) However, we are of the view that
the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 Sup. Ct. 2105 (1971), (i.e.,
whether the State activity has a secular purpose, whether
its primary effect will not advance or inhibit religion, and
whether it will not foster excessive government entanglement with religion) will be satisfied, and that no constitutional bar exists which would prevent the 'State of Oregon
from broadcasting its proposed programs. 52
The Commission dismissed the petition for reconsideration and affirmed its grant of the KVDO-TV license to the Oregon State Board of
Higher Education.
III.

RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING ON EDUCATIONAL
RESERVED CHANNELS

Probably no aspect of the Commission's policy toward religious
broadcasting has received the outpouring of public comment that has
been accorded the Commission's efforts to deal with religious broadcasting on the educational reserve channels. For many years, Commission policy in this field was marked by the issuance of decisions on an

50.
51.
52.

In Re Corvallis TV Cable Co. and State of Or., 59 F.C.C.2d 1282 (1976).
Id. at 1284 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1284-85.
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ad hoc basis with no accompanying rationale to support the agency's
action. This absence of agency discussion served to mask a policy
which, in fact, discriminated against religious applicants. In the 1970's
an overt effort was made to disqualify religious broadcasters from the
educational reserved band. While this effort was turned back, proposals now pending before the agency could have the effect of making
many religious applicants ineligible in this band.
A.

Eligibility Under FCC Regulations

The educational reserved channels consist of those FM radio and
UHF television channels which have been set aside by the Commission
for purposes of fostering nonprofit, noncommercial educational
broadcasting.53 The Commission's rules define only in general terms
those persons and groups who are qualified to be educational licensees.
As a result, the Commission's policy toward granting applications for
these channels has been developed primarily on an ad hoc basis and, as
the Commission itself has recognized, often has lacked consistency. As
we shall demonstrate, the ad hoc policy often creates barriers to
religious applications that are not faced by secular organizations.
Section 73.621 of the Commission's rules defines the persons eligible to apply for non-commercial educational UHF television broadcast
stations. A similar provision governs applications for educational FM
radio stations. The Commission's rules provide that:
[n]oncommercial educational broadcast stations will be
licensed only to nonprofit educational organizations upon a
showing that the proposed stations will be used primarily to
serve the educational needs of the community; for the advancement of educational programs; and to furnish a nonprofit and noncommercial television broadcast service. 4
The rules do not set forth the specific standard for determining
eligibilty, but only indicate the factors that should be considered. For
example, "[in determining the eligibility of publicly supported educational organizations, the accreditation of their respective state departments of education shall be taken into consideration."' Similarly, "[iun
determining the eligibility of privately controlled educational

53. The UHF stations reserved for educational broadcasting are specified in
47 C.F.R. § 73.606(a) (1980); the channels available for assignment for educational FM
broadcasting are set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 73.501(a) (1980).
54. 47 C.F.R. § 73.621(a) (1980).
55. Id. at § 73.621(a)(1).
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organizations, the accreditation of state departments of education or
recognized regional and national educational accrediting organizations
shall be taken into consideration.""6 As discussed below, the FCC has
distinguished in practice between "educational organizations" and
"educational institutions." In general, the Commission has permitted
educational institutions to become licensees on the educational reserved band only in cities where they operate a school.
Under the Commission's rules, noncommercial educational television broadcast stations are permitted to transmit educational, cultural
and entertainment programs, as well as programs designed for use by
schools and school systems in connection with regular school courses,
including routine and administrative material." Educational stations
may also broadcast programs produced by or furnished by persons
other than the licensee, provided that no consideration except the program and the cost incidental to its production and broadcast are
received by the licensee. In other words, the licensee may not air programming for profit as if he were a commercial broadcaster.
B.

Early Development of FCC Policy on Eligibility

The Commission has had a great deal of difficulty defining
exactly what "educational" means in the context of eligibility for
licenses on the educational reserved channels. With respect to
religious broadcasters, the Commission's initial development of policy
came in a series of actions without opinion.58 An early statement of the
Commission's policy on educational allocations came in S. Nisenbaum,59
a decision on a petition for rulemaking to limit eligibility to educational
institutions or affiliated bodies that were accredited by state departments of education or recognized regional and national educational
accrediting organizations. The petitioner sought the proposed rule
change because of a fear that individuals and groups unable or unqualified to acquire commercial FM broadcast facilities would apply for noncommercial educational FM broadcast frequencies merely by organiz56. Id. at § 73.621(a)(2). If a municipality or other political subdivision has no
independently constituted educational organization such as a board of education, the
municipality itself may be eligible for a noncommercial educational television broadcast station. However, in such circumstances, the Commission requires "a full and
detailed showing" indicating "that a grant of the application will be consistent with the
intent and purpose of the Commission's rules and regulations relating to such
stations." Id. at § 73.621(b).
57. Id. at § 73.621(c).
58. The rationale of these actions eventually was set forth in a series of
published opinions, discussed in text accompanying notes 60-67 infra.
59. 19 P&F Rad. Reg. 1175 (1960).
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ing nonprofit corporations and stating that their objectives were
educational. The purpose of the petition was to ensure that educational
FM stations would be under the control and direction of educators who
supposedly would develop genuinely educational programs.
The Commission determined that the restrictive proposal
examined in S. Nisenbaum was not in the public interest. According to
the Commission, "[iut cannot be assumed that an educational organization under private control is not a bona fide educational organization
with responsible management and without worthy educational objectives simply because it lacks accreditation by a recognized accrediting
organization because of ineligibility for accreditation or some other
reason."' The Commission found that such a limitation would not be
conducive to the most fruitful development of the FM noncommercial
educational broadcast service. The few licenses held by privately controlled educational organizations had been granted, according to the
Commission, "only after thorough consideration of their qualifications
as nonprofit educational organizations and their showings that they
would provide a nonprofit and noncommercial broadcast service for
the advancement of an educational program.''"
With this background, the Commission subsequently returned,
without opinion, several applications for noncommercial educational
channels filed by religious groups, thus-in effect-finding that these
groups did not meet the qualifications for licensees on the educational
reserve band.2
The rationale of the Commission's decisions with respect to
religious organizations applying for educational channels was first set
forth in an opinion in the case of Bible Moravian Church, Inc."3 The
application of the Bible Moravian Church was returned by the Broadcast Bureau as unacceptable for filing because the applicant was not
considered to be an educational organization within the meaning of the
Commission's Rules, but rather, a religious organization and, as such,
ineligible to hold the requested authorization. The Bible Moravian
Church petitioned for reconsideration on the grounds that it was in
60. Id. at 1176.
61. Id. at 1177.
62. See, e.g., Keswick Foundation, Inc., 26 F.C.C.2d 1025 (1970); Christ Church
Foundation, Inc., 13 F.C.C.2d 987 (1968). Christ Church Foundation subsequently
organized the National Educational Foundation and resubmitted the application. The
application was again rejected. After further organizational changes to establish the
separation of the National Educational Foundation from Christ Church Foundation, the
application was accepted for filing. See Bible Moravian Church, 28 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 (1971).
63. 28 F.C.C.2d 1 (1971).
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fact an eligible educational organization. The Church argued that
education is the "quintessence" of religion and a principal purpose of
the Church. 4 The Church also stated that, since accreditation of applicants is not mandatory, its application was not patently defective and
could not be returned without consideration.
The Commission denied the suggestion in the Church's petition
that the Commission had taken the position that there was no overlap
between organizations having educational as distinguished from
religious purposes. According to the opinion, organizations with religious purposes could be qualified where "the primary thrust is educational, albeit with a religious aspect to the educational activity.""5 The
Commission stated, "we look to the application as a whole to determine
which is the essential purpose and which is incidental.""6 Despite the
authority in the Church's Articles to engage in educational activity,
the Commission noted that it could find no real evidence that this purpose had been significantly implemented. Rather, the Commission
believed, based on the Church's statement of programming policies
and objectives submitted with its application, that its purpose was its
function as a place of public worship. While recognizing that the
Church was a "nonprofit organization with meritorious purposes,'' 7
the Commission found that the purpose of the proposed station was
primarily worship, not education.
C.

The Lansman and Milam Petition

In 1974, religious broadcasting and the educational band came
into the spotlight. In December 1974, Jeremy D. Lansman and Lorenzo
W. Milam filed a petition with the Commission requesting, among
other things, a freeze on all applications by religious "Bible," Christian, and other sectarian schools, colleges and institutes for licenses on
reserved educational FM and TV channels.68
The Lansman and Milam Petition-popularly dubbed the "Petition Against God" - gained instant notoriety because it included a
vituperative attack on religious broadcasting and religious programming. In substance, the petition challenged the Commission's licensing
of religious organizations and institutions in the educational reserved
band as a policy contrary to the public interest and as in violation of
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Petition for Rulemaking, No. RM-2493 (filed December 1974).
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the First Amendment. Even though the Commission rejected the
Lansman and Milam Petition in August 1975, comments and responses
to the petition have continued to pour in and now number in the
millions. Public response to the petition has generated so much mail as
to cause serious administrative difficulties within the Commission
itself. Even after the rejection, many persons unaware of the Commission's action have continued to send mail, to such extent that in
January 1981, FCC Chairman Charles Ferris, in remarks before the
annual convention of the National Religious Broadcasters, again
clarified that the petition has been dismissed.
In rejecting the Lansman and Milam Petition, the Commission
stated that it maintained a position of neutrality toward religious
applicants for allocations on the educational reserved channels. 9 The
Commission criticized the petitioners' proposal to disqualify all
religiously affiliated organizations and institutions from eligibility to
operate on educational reserved channels. According to the Commission, this would result in "discrimination against a school or university
simply by virtue of the fact that it is owned and operated by a sectarian organization."7 The Commission stated that the First Amendment requires governmental agencies "to observe a stance of neutrality toward religion, acting neither to promote nor inhibit religion."'"
Under this principle of neutrality, the agency stated that religious
groups, like other groups, may become broadcast licensees and that,
like other licensees, religious groups will be subject to enforceable
public obligations."
The Commission reiterated its policy that "a religious organization that qualifies as educational because it operates a school or university is eligible to operate a broadcast station on a channel reserved for
noncommercial educational use in the community where it operates
the school.173 However, where an organization's central or primary
purpose is religious, the Commission stated that it would be ineligible
for an educational channel absent an affiliation with an educational institution in the community of license. The Commission criticized the
Lansman and Milam Petition as expressing "personal" views on
religious programming and for submitting unproven assumptions that

69.
Commercial
70.
71.
72.
73.

See In Re Revision of Rules Permitting Multiple Ownership of NonEduc. Radio and Tele. Stations in Single Mkts, 54 F.C.C.2d 941 (1975).
Id. at 949.
Id. (citing King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
Id. at 949.
Id. at 949-50 (citations omitted).
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programming on religiously affiliated stations "is stultifying and/or
timid. 74
D.

The Moody Bible Case

Following the rejection of the Lansman and Milam Petition, the
Commission continued its ad hoc approach toward determining the
eligibility of religious organizations for channels in the educational7
reserve band. However, the decision in The Moody Bible Institute
indicated that the Commission was not entirely comfortable with its
case-by-case approach to determining the educational status of
religious institutional applicants.
The Moody Bible Institute had applied for FM station licenses on
the educational reserve band in East Moline, Illinois, and Boynton
Beach, Florida. The Commission's Broadcast Bureau initially opposed
the Moody application on the ground that the proposed operations
would be religious rather than educational in nature. However, in a
brief two sentence order, the Commission held that the Moody Bible
Institute was qualified to operate noncommercial educational FM
broadcast stations in the cities for which it had applied and ordered
that the applications be granted. The two concurring statements, one
by Chairman Wiley, in which Commissioner Hooks joined, and a second
by Commissioner White, questioned the policy of issuing orders
without an accompanying opinion which would set forth a coherent
explanation of agency policy. Chairman Wiley's statement expressed
particular concern "that our present standard is unclear with respect
to the eligibility of religious vis-a-vis nonreligious organizations."7 6
While recognizing that religious organizations must have their applications judged on the same basis as nonreligious organizations,
Chairman Wiley stated that "[ujnfortunately, based on past cases, it
is not readily apparent that all organizations applying for Section
77
73.503 grants have been so judged.
Commissioner White's concurring statement likewise questioned
the standards that the Commission had applied to religious educational organizations. Commissioner White stated that "religion and
education have been intertwined throughout history," and that "it is
not the province of government to say that religion, or theology, is
unacceptable as a subject of education and instruction." Her concur74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
66
Id.
Id.

at 950.
F.C.C.2d 162 (1977).
at 163.
at 164.
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rence focused upon the Commission's responsibility to avoid infringement of the free exercise of religion or speech. According to Commissioner White, the agency's efforts to determine the religious nature of
the institution applying for the station intruded impermissibly upon
the freedom of expression. Commissioner White also questioned the
effect of the policy in placing on "primarily religious" applicants the
additional burden of showing that the operation of a school in the
community to which the station is to be licensed. In reviewing the
ad hoc policy, Commissioner White concluded that the requirement
that a school be operated in the city of license had been applied only
to religious organizations,"8 and that the requirement was clearly
discriminatory.79
E.

Proposalsfor New Standards of Eligibility

Following the decision in Moody Bible, which gave somewhat
equivocal endorsement to the continuation of the ad hoc policy on
eligibility for license in the educational reserve band, the Commission
issued a set of "processing guidelines" which purported to establish a
nondiscriminatory policy for handling religious applicants. In addition,
the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry in an effort to bring some
consistent standards to its determination." The Notice of Inquiry did
not deal specifically with religious broadcasting, though the standards
of eligibility proposed in the Notice likely would have an impact upon
many religious applicants for licenses on the educational reserved
channels. According to the Commission, the impetus for the Notice
was that following the development of its ad hoc policy, "cases arose in
which the educational nature of an applicant or its purposes might not
be entirely clear."8 The Commission's concern was, "to insure that an
applicant's proposal is designed to serve educational purposes. In so
doing, the Commission had examined the totality of the application to
determine the applicant's primary purposes and to insure that they
were educational." 82 The Commission requested comments on five
alternative standards for determining eligibility.

78. Id. at 167.
79. As Commissioner White noted, the Commission had granted several
licenses to educational foundations which were not religiously affiliated even where
the educational organization did not maintain a school at all, much less a school in each
community of license. Id. (concurring statement).
80. FCC Eligibility for Non-Commercial Educational FM and TV Broadcast
Station Licenses, 43 Fed. Reg. 30,842 (1978).
81. Id. at 30,842 (1 3).
82. Id.
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Under the first alternative, the Commission would delete the
restriction of the reserve channels for noncommercial educational purposes. Instead, it would permit the channels to be used by any nonprofit organization recognized by the Internal Revenue Service. Thus,
the allocations could be used for noncommercial purposes not previously permitted by the Commission. The Commission expressed some concern that this approach might be contrary to congressional intent, as
expressed in recognizing a particular category of "educational" noncommercial radio and television stations through the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.83 The Commission viewed this approach as "the
most profound departure from past practices."8
Under the second alternative, the Commission would adopt the
standards provided by the former Department of Health, Education
and Welfare8" for purposes of administering grants for construction of
educational broadcast facilities pursuant to the Educational Broadcast
Facilities Act of 1962.8" This approach would shift the onus to another
government agency to resolve the issue of eligibility for educational
stations. Although the Commission did not raise the issue, it would
appear that adoption of grant standards of another governmental
agency for purposes of determining eligibility for licenses on the
educational reserve band would have a definite impact upon most
religious applicants. Certainly, questions of violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment would be raised more sharply,
since eligibility for license would depend upon eligiblity for federal
funds that could not be used to "advance religion."
Under the third alternative, the Commission would redefine the
eligibility standards to encompass only full-time, general curriculum
schools or institutions which are qualified to award degrees or issue
diplomas. Under this standard, the Commission could avoid deep
inquiries into the educational purposes of the applicant, since all
applicants would be expected to operate the station in conjunction
with an educational institution. This proposal would also affect a
number of unaffiliated educational foundations, such as the Pacifica
Foundation, and a number of other foundations set up and established
specifically for the purpose of operating public television or radio stations in some communities. The Commission suggested the possibility
of grandfathering existing licenses.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Codified at 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
43 Fed. Reg. 30,843 (1 6).
These functions have since been transferred.
47 U.S.C. § 390 et seq. (1976 & Supp. 1979).
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Under the fourth alternative, the Commission would focus on the
nature of the educational program to be furthered. This proposal
would shift the focus from the purposes of the organizational applicant
itself and focus instead on the proposals for operation of the station. A
drawback to this approach would be the need for the Commission to inquire into what programming would be offered, and thus risk some
danger of running afoul of First Amendment concerns through intrusion into speech.
The fifth and final alternative would impose stricter ascertainment requirements on public broadcasters, much like those imposed
upon commercial broadcasters. Thus, educational broadcasters would
be required to assess the community needs and then offer programming designed to meet those needs. The same approach has long been
used in commercial broadcasting as a means to insure broadcasting in
the public interest, while avoiding detailed inquiries into the nature of
the programming itself. Of course, since the Commission issued its
Notice of Inquiry, it has decided to repeal ascertainment requirements
for commercial radio broadcasters. Thus, while a rationale could be formulated for applying ascertainment to educational broadcasters, the
fact that the Commission has rejected this approach as unnecessary
and wasteful for commercial broadcasters may militate against the
adoption of a similar rule for noncommercial broadcasters in general.
The Commission also invited comments on other standards which
could be adopted.
The Commission has never acted upon its 1978 Notice of Inquiry,
and it appears likely at this stage that any further action on it will be
in the hands of the new FCC Chairman and the new Commissioners appointed by President Reagan. The proceeding at this time is not active.
In summary, the Commission's policies regarding broadcasting
on the educational reserve band have proceeded thus far in an ad hoc
fashion and little explanation has been given about the factors which
govern licensing decisions. While the Commission has frequently
stated its objective of remaining neutral toward the religious nature of
applicants and of treating secular and religious applicants alike, its
position that religious broadcasting is not necessarily educational has,
at times, caused sharp differences in the treatment of religious and
secular applicants. Religious organizations applying for educational
reserved channels have often been subject to an additional requirement of demonstrating that they operate or are affiliated with a school
or other educational institution in the community which they propose
to serve. The application of this "school in the city" standard appears
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to be much less strict where nonreligious applicants are involved.
Finally, in view of the agency's pending rulemaking on licensing standards, future policy for the educational reserve band remains very
much in doubt.
IV.

FCC RULES ON FUNDRAISING
BY RELIGIOUS BROADCASTERS

IMPACT OF

FCC policies affecting fundraising activities have particular
relevance to religious broadcasting because many religious broadcasters rely upon voluntary contributions to meet their program expenses. While the FCC has never promulgated specific rules concerning fundraising by religious broadcasters, it does police fundraising
practices indirectly through its triennial license renewal. Limitations
on the fundraising practices of broadcasters are, of course, much
stricter for noncommercial educational stations, since the Commission
has a substantial concern that some fundraising practices closely
approach commercial broadcasting, and thus are improper for stations
operating on the educational reserved band. Since secular educational
stations also engage in fundraising over-the-air, the FCC's policies on
fundraising over educational stations are-as one might expect
-much more settled.
A.

The Faith Center Case

In recent years the FCC has shown an increased willingness to
scrutinize the fundraising practices of religious broadcasters, even
with respect to programming on commercial stations. The Commission
has stated that fundraising practices may be relevant in determining
whether a broadcaster has the requisite character qualifications to remain a licensee of the Commission. While the decisions have not laid
down express formulations of the restrictions on a religious broadcaster's fundraising practices, the boundaries of the Commission's concern can be discerned from decisions involving FCC investigations,
particularly the celebrated Faith Center renewal case.
Some religious broadcasters have questioned whether the "free
exercise" clause in the First Amendment of the Constitution bars inquiry into the fundraising practices of religious broadcasters." The
Commission has taken the position that a broadcast license is a public
trust which carries with it enforceable public interest obligations,
87. See, e.g., Faith Center, Inc., 82 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980); PTL of Heritage Village
Church and Missionary Fellowship, Inc., 71 F.C.C.2d 324, (1979).
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regardless of the religious status of the licensee."8 Thus, the Commission's stated policy is to enforce all its rules equally with regard to all
broadcasters, whether religious or not. In its Faith Center decision,
the Commission expressed its belief that this policy avoids issues of
favoring or disfavoring religion, or of government entanglement in
religious affairs, which might arise if the Commission gave preferred
status or special privileges to either group. Thus, the Commission has
construed the First Amendment guarantees of religious freedom as
permitting incidental restriction of religious-oriented affairs, so long
as an important governmental purpose is involved and the purpose of
the regulation is not to favor or harm religion.
1.

Background

In the Faith Center decision, the Commission affirmed the
dismissal with prejudice of the renewal application of Faith Center,
Inc., for television station KHOF-TV in San Bernardino, California.
The decision was based on a finding that Faith Center had failed to prosecute its application for renewal by refusing in bad faith to reply to a
request for discovery of evidence filed by the Broadcast Bureau during
the proceeding. The majority of the discovery request related to Faith
Center's fundraising practices. Thus, the Commission never reached
the legal or factual issues of whether the fundraising practices of Faith
Center were contrary to Commission rules and policies.
Faith Center's KHOF-TV renewal application was originally
designated for hearing in October 1978 on issues concerning alleged
fraud by broadcast and failure to provide information to the FCC. The
Broadcast Bureau alleged that the licensee had refused to permit inspection of records of fund solicitations. The FCC had also sought to
obtain videotapes of programs on which fundraising appeals allegedly
had been made. According to the Commission's opinion, the FCC had
sought this information because of allegations of misconduct in connection with Faith Center's fundraising practices; namely, that Faith
Center had raised money for specific projects that were never carried
out, that some funds obtained from over-the-air solicitations were used
for other organizations in which the president of Faith Center had an
interest, and that fundraising appeals had been accompanied by false
statements that Faith Center's president contributed his own funds to
the church and received only one dollar per year.
88. With respect to the Commission's equal employment opportunities laws,
this interpretation of the constitutional restrictions of the First Amendment was
upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in King's Garden, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
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The Commission's opinion focused on Faith Center's alleged
refusal to answer discovery requests by the Broadcast Bureau during
the course of the renewal proceedings. The Broadcast Bureau originally requested discovery on December 8, 1978. After a number of procedural delays, Faith Center submitted a response on February 1,
1979. The Broadcast Bureau, believing the response inadequate,
moved for the presiding Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)to compel
discovery. The ALJ substantially granted the Bureau's request and
held that the constitutional grounds which Faith Center asserted for
its refusal already had been rejected at the prehearing conference.
Upon the ALJ's refusal to permit direct appeal to the Commission,
Faith Center appealed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and
sought a stay of the FCC's action based on its constitutional
arguments. The court dismissed the appeal on July 13, 1979.
Asserting that Faith Center had not complied with its discovery
obligations, the Bureau moved on July 30, 1979, to dismiss Faith
Center's renewal application. Repeated efforts by the Bureau to obtain
discovery culminated in a December 4, 1979 Order by the ALJ that rejected Faith Center's objections and ordered strict compliance with
outstanding discovery requests within two weeks. Faith Center appealed the order to the Commission, which denied the appeal on
December 28, 1979.
On January 14, 1980, Faith Center notified the ALJ of its election
to pursue a distress sale, and, on February 29, 1980, filed a petition for
special relief proposing a distress sale of KHOF-TV and co-owned
KVOF-TV and WHCT-TV.8 The ALJ refused to hold proceedings in
abeyance on the grounds that Faith Center had had adequate time to
pursue a distress sale and had apparently elected not to do so. Faith
Center first had raised the possibility of a distress sale in January
1979, at which time the ALJ had extended the hearing date as an
accommodation to Faith Center.
In a March 12, 1980 decision, the ALJ dismissed Faith Center's
renewal application for failure to prosecute. According to the FCC, the
dismissal resulted from "inadequate 'piecemeal, partial and
minimal' "90 response to discovery by Faith Center, despite multiple
89. Under the FCC's distress sale policy, a licensee whose renewal application
has been designated for hearing may elect to sell his station to a qualified minorityowned buyer rather than risk an unfavorable outcome at hearing. The sale must be for
less than 75 percent of the appraised value of the station. Apart from the distress sale
policy, the FCC generally will not permit the sale of a station where the renewal application has been designated for hearing.
90. 82 F.C.C.2d at 7.
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extensions of time and several orders mandating full compliance. Furthermore, according to the Commission's opinion, "[a]n examination of
several of Faith Center's responses to interrogatories convinced the
ALJ that Faith's answers were contrived to avoid full and candid
disclosure to the Commission, and represented a studied effort to
avoid producing any information which could be at all harmful to its
9
case." '
2.

The Commission's Analysis of First Amendment "Free
Exercise" Restraints on Regulation of Religious Broadcasters

The Commission, on review, generally agreed with the ALJ's
negative assessment of Faith Center's constitutional arguments. Faith
Center argued that the First Amendment prevented the Commission
from inquiring into how funds collected through over-the-air solicitations were spent because it prohibits an entanglement of church and
state. A similar objection was raised to inquiries directed at the expense records of Faith Center's president.
The Commission drew a distinction between freedom to believe,
which is absolute, and the freedom to act. According to the decision,
conduct may be subject to regulation even if an indirect burden on
religious belief may result. The Commission characterized the Broadcast Bureau's inquiry into Faith Center's qualifications as involving
not matters of religious belief, but questions of secular fact: whether
the funds donated by listeners were used for the purposes for which
they were solicited and whether alleged statements relating to the
compensation and pledges of Faith Center's president-supposedly
made to induce contributions- were in fact true. Recognizing limits on
its power to investigate, the Commission said that its examination of
Faith Center's affairs was "only in response to allegations of specific
fraudulent acts, which we must examine in order to make a determination whether to renew Faith's license. 92
The Commission found no improper entanglement of church and
state because the inquiry focused on a narrow and legitimate governmental interest-the qualifications of Faith Center to remain a
licensee in light of allegations of fraud. The decision stressed that the
concern with contributions to Faith Center and the compensation of its
president arose from charges that these matters were misrepresented
in Faith Center's broadcasts. According to the Commission, Faith

91.
92.

Id.
Id. at 19.
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Center, by conducting fundraising through broadcasting, elected to
occupy a public forum and that such forums are limited in number.
Thus, Faith Center subjected itself to public interest obligations, and
its exercise of First Amendment rights had to be balanced against injury to the public. The Commission concluded that evenhanded inquiry
into allegations of misconduct by both religious and secular licensees
places the government in a less objectionable posture than special
treatment for religious broadcasters.
Having found that Faith Center's constitutional claims were
groundless, the Commission concluded that Faith Center was without
justification for failing to respond to discovery. The Commission
agreed in general that the Broadcast Bureau's discovery requests
were legitimate and sought relevant evidence. According to the decision, Faith Center's performance during discovery "display[ed] bad
faith" and its "consistent refusals to respond during the discovery
phase of this proceeding so obstructed the orderly conduct of these
proceedings that Faith has failed to prosecute its application."93 The
Commission pointed in particular to Faith Center's alleged continued
failure to respond following an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals on its motion to stay the FCC proceedings.
The Commission also affirmed the ALJ's refusal to permit a
distress sale of KHOF-TV. According to the decision, Faith Center's
conduct raised more serious questions than merely a dilatory election
for a distress sale. The Commission believed that approval of a distress
sale would shield Faith Center from the consequences of bad faith
obstruction of Commission proceedings. In short, the Commission held
that, while a distress sale petition filed early in a proceeding carries a
presumption of validity, a licensee is not entitled to this extraordinary
relief if his filing is delayed until just prior to hearing.94
3.

Significance of the Faith Center Case

The principal significance of the decision on Faith Center's
renewal application lies in demonstrating that the Commission is willing to impose a harsh sanction-dismissing a renewal application with
prejudice and denying distress sale relief-for a licensee's refusal in
renewal proceedings to provide information on its broadcast-related
fundraising activities. However, the decision suggests that sanctions
of this magnitude will be applied only for repeated refusals to
cooperate following explicit warnings.
93.

Id. at 24.

94. Id.
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Leaving aside the accuracy of the facts relied upon by the Commission, the Commission's First Amendment analysis does not
substantially depart from past decisions in which the Commission has
asserted that religious organizations cannot become exempt from
Commission regulations by merging their licensed franchises into
their ecclesiastical structures. The decision does stress, however, the
FCC's view that factual representations, unrelated to faith and doctrine and made in a religious broadcast to induce donations, fall within
its regulatory purview and may be investigated where fraud is alleged.
While the Commission did not indicate that a shifting of funds from the
purpose for which they were solicited to some other use would
necessarily bear on a licensee's character qualifications, it appears
clear that the Commission would take a dim view of such practices
absent a bona fide reason.
B. The Potentialfor FCC Action Against Questionable
FundraisingPractices
In light of the Faith Center case and other recent Commission
decisions, it appears that the major concern of the Commission with
regard to fundraising practices of religious broadcasters is with
misrepresentations by licensees made in connection with their overthe-air fundraising efforts. Thus, where the licensee has solicited donations over the air for a particular project, the Commission may inquire
to determine whether donations were actually spent for that project
and whether representations made to induce contributions were accurate and made in good faith.
In some instances, questions may be raised by licensee conduct
even when the licensee himself believed he was acting in good faith.
For example, a licensee may solicit funds for a particular project and
subsequently determine that the project is not feasible or that funds
are no longer required. While the licensee's natural reaction may be to
shift the funds to a similar worthy project in need of additional money,
the Commission may take a dim view of such a practice if it is contrary
to prior representations made to the broadcast audience. Apparently,
the theory underlying the Commission's concern is that representations have been made over the air for the purpose of inducing contributions. If contributions are forthcoming, the Commission apparently
expects the funds to be used for the stated purpose.
While it is not clear that the FCC necessarily would impose sanctions where funds were shifted from the original recipient in good
faith, the safe course for a broadcaster would certainly be to return the
funds to the donors or to obtain their consent for the alternative purhttps://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss1/2
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pose. If a broadcaster can foresee the possibility that a project may not
ultimately be able to use the funds solicited, a simpler course may be to
ensure that any on-the-air solicitation correctly embodies and
describes any alternative uses to which the funds may be put.
As the Commission indicated in its Faith Center decision, other
representations made to induce donations may also result in problems
for a licensee if the representations are not strictly accurate. A
representation that an individual fundraiser receives no salary or
nominal salary from his organization may be regarded as a promise
made to induce contributions, and the FCC may well expect the broadcaster accurately to describe the relevant circumstances. Similarly, a
representation that a fundraiser has pledged his own money to a project may also be regarded as a promise made to induce contributions.
It is questionable whether a pledge by a fundraiser couched in terms
which condition the promise "upon God providing.., the money" will
avoid a possible misrepresentation issue before the FCC."
Thus far, the Commission has not attempted more than incidental
inquiries into the off-the-air fundraising activities of religious broadcasters. However, under the same principles applied to secular broadcasters, off-the-air activities are not necessarily beyond the Commission's scrutiny, though, of course, religious broadcasters could raise
much stronger First Amendment arguments against inquiries of this
nature.
In general, off-the-air conduct by a broadcaster also may be relevant to the question of whether the broadcaster has the requisite
character qualifications to remain a licensee of the Commission.
Character issues may arise in several ways. In addition to investigations by the FCC or by other governmental agencies, concern about a
licensee's character may arise from convictions or civil judgments
relating to violations of law. In addition, the Commission may raise an
issue of character based upon third party allegations of licensee conduct, even if a violation of law has not been established and even if a
licensee has entered into a consent order with a governmental body
95. Where misrepresentations are purposely made for the purpose of inducing
contributions, the broadcaster may have committed a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C. §
1343 (1976).
96. Under 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1976 & Supp. 1979) "[a]ll applications for station
licensees, or modifications or renewals thereof, shall set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and financial,
technical, and other qualifications of the applicant to operate the station ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also FCC Policy re: Violation by Applicants of Laws of the U.S., 42
F.C.C.2d 399 (1951).
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concerning the subject matter of the allegations. Moreover, misconduct need not rise to the level of a violation of law in order for the Commission to consider a licensee's character.
Certain activities by religious licensees may have inherent
dangers of technical violations of law which could result in a character
issue being raised. For example, some religious broadcasters reportedly have publicized the sale of church bonds and other financial
instruments over the air. While these promotions may be for laudable
purposes, broadcasters should be aware that sales of securities are
strictly and meticulously regulated by both state and federal agencies. An oversight or omission or a technique of promotion which
would not appear on its face to be morally wrong may often constitute
a violation of state or federal law, and thus could result in an issue
being designated against a licensee at renewal time.
Procedurally, questions about licensee fundraising activities
may arise in a number of ways. The Commission may of course institute revocation or forfeiture proceedings aimed at removing a
broadcaster's license or imposing a fine. Additionally, the Commission
may raise the character issue at renewal time as a basis for denying
renewal of a license. Third parties with an interest in a broadcaster's
assigned channel may also raise character issues as a means to disqualify the incumbent licensee and make the channel available for
themselves. Finally, in applications for an unoccupied channel, opposing parties or the Commission itself may raise character issues as a
basis for disqualifying an applicant.
Conceivably, the Commission could impose a number of sanctions
if it should discover that a licensee has engaged in improper fundraising practices. Of course, to sustain in court a decision imposing a sanction on a broadcaster, the FCC would have to demonstrate the
reasonableness of its actions in light of the public interest standard.
The most drastic sanction is revocation of the license or refusal to
renew the license. As a lesser sanction, the Commission may impose a
fine or forfeiture. Additionally, the Commission may choose to impose
a short-term renewal, and thus require a broadcaster to apply for
renewal again before the usual three year period has expired. Shortterm renewals may also be conditioned upon reporting by the licensee
to the Commission to insure that proper standards are being followed
and that the circumstances giving rise to the short-term renewal have
been or are being cured.
The Commission has taken the position that a religious organization cannot insulate its on-the-air fund raising practices from scrutiny
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss1/2
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merely because the broadcast operation is closely associated with a
religious institution. Thus, if a church or similar institution is virtually
merged with the broadcast station operation, the Commission may
examine its operations. Licensees have been generally unsuccessful in
resisting the Commission's efforts to inquire into their fund raising
practices under such circumstances, as indicated, for example, by the
recent Faith Center case.
A licensee may also face problems from the FCC with regard to
programs produced by other parties, as well as fund raising on programs which the licensee has produced himself. Thus, if a licensee is
aware of the improper fundraising practices of another party whose
program he airs, the conduct of the other party may be attributable to
the licensee under some circumstances. Moreover, if the licensee is
unaware that improper fundraising tactics are being used on programs
which he airs, a question may arise as to whether the licensee has
maintained adequate control of his license facilities. An issue of this
nature can be quite serious and in some instances may support
nonrenewal of a broadcast license.
C.

Self-Regulation by Religious Broadcasters

The Commission's apparent willingness to inquire into the fundraising practices bf religious broadcasters has led many broadcasters
to examine their own financial standards and practices to ensure that
they abide by the FCC's rules and policies and generally accepted standards of accountability such as those embodied in the "Principles and
Guidelines for Fund Raising, Accounting, and Financial Reporting by
Christian Organizations" issued by the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB). The NRB's guidelines stress, to a far greater extent
than has the Commission itself, the responsibility of religious broadcasters for accuracy and truthfulness in fundraising. For example, the
NRB's standards require that all requests for support be "truthful and
forthright" and that "funds collected be used for the intended purpose
and not be absorbed by excessive fundraising costs." The NRB
guidelines state, without qualification, "[tihe donor must be informed
at the time of solicitation how the donated funds will be used and the
designations, if any, stated by the donor will be observed." The standards also urge that "the governing body [of any organization engaged
in religious broadcasting] shall seek to avoid business transactions in
which board members, staff, or their family have a financial interest."97
97. The allegation of conflicts between business and fundraising activities
was an issue or principal concern to the Commission in the Faith Center case.
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The NRB guidelines also impose strict standards of financial
reporting. For example, an annual audit by an independent accounting
firm is required. The guidelines stipulate that annual reports providing a financial summary of the work and the spiritual dimensions of
the ministry must be made available to donors and to the public on
reasonable request and that reasonable requests from donors for information about designated gifts should be met. The NRB guidelines
recognize that fundraising authority and disbursement authority
should not be vested exclusively in any one individual and that, in no
case, should inside development staff or outside fundraising consultants be reimbursed on the basis of percentage 'of the funds received by a religious organization. Finally, the NRB guidelines
stipulate that requests for funds should not be associated with
material objects which are inconsistent with the spiritual purposes of
the appeal.
In summary, the FCC's policies regarding fundraising by religious broadcasters thus far do not appear to threaten religious
broadcasting or to have a significant negative impact on religious
broadcasters. The concerns of the Commission are far narrower than
the strict standards which organizations such as the National
Religious Broadcasters impose upon their own members. Doubtlessly,
however, there will be occasions where individual religious broadcasters, despite good faith actions, may be called to account for and defend their fundraising practices. While, obviously, such a proceeding
may be costly and time consuming to the individual licensee affected,
nothing in the Commission's actions to date suggests that its power of
inquiry will be broadly exercised.
Religious broadcasters have a particularly high obligation to insure that their fundraising activities accord with applicable law and
ethical standards. Because of the tendency of the public to generalize,
the misdeeds of a few boradcasters may be attributed in the public's
mind to all religious broadcasters. Accordingly, the efforts of religious
broadcasters and religious broadcasting organizations to encourage
voluntary self-regulation is a substantial contribution to the mission of
religious broadcasters as a whole.
V.

RELIGIOUS BROADCASTERS AND COMPARATIVE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE

FCC

Where more than a single applicant applies for a broadcast channel, the FCC will hold comparative hearings to determine which application to grant. Comparative proceedings arise most often where
applicants seek new facilities-that is, previously unallocated chanhttps://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss1/2
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nels. Competing applications may also be filed for a presently occupied
frequency. However, since it is generally felt that incumbent licensees
enjoy an advantage because of a proven record of performance,
relatively few applicants attempt to supplant incumbent broadcasters,
unless the incumbent's record indicates extremely poor performance
or conduct which might disqualify him altogether as a licensee.
An issue which has been raised often with respect to religious
applicants in comparative hearings relates to the specialized nature of
the programming proposed. 8 Generally, the question has arisen in
terms of whether specialized religious programming should be permitted where other applicants propose more generalized programming appealing to a wider variety of taste. While programming issues
of this sort formerly were common in comparative cases, a recent decision by the Commission has made it very difficult to add specialized
programming issues. Thus, as we shall discuss, the Commission's comparative treatment of religious programming is unlikely to have a
substantial impact upon religious applicants in comparative proceedings.
The Commission's concern with the public interest implications of
specialized formats was articulated soon after the passage of the Communications Act of 1934 in In Re Young Peoples Association for the
Propagation of the Gospel.99 This case was not a comparative proceeding, but a decision on the qualifications of the Association to be a
licensee. As the Commission observed in its decision, the Association
proposed to use the station "primarily for the dissemination of
religious programs to advance the fundamentalist interpretation of
the Bible"' 0 and had stated that "in connection with religious broadcasts the station's facilities would be extended only to those whose
tenets and beliefs in the interpretation of the Bible coincided with
those of the applicant.. 0. The Association did not propose similar
98. When more than one applicant seeks a single frequency, the Commission
will designate the applications for a comparative hearing. A comparative hearing is an
evidentiary proceeding in which the parties litigate the question of which prospective
licensee would best serve the public interest. The FCC, after examining the applications, issues a designation order stating the issues to be resolved in the comparative
hearing. The applicants themselves may also seek to add additional issues, including
comparative issues which would give them a preference over other applicants, comparative issues which would have a negative impact on other applicants, or basic
qualifications issues going to the question of whether a particular party is qualified to
be an applicant at all.
99. 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938).
100. Id. at 180.
101. Id. at 181.
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restrictions on the use of the station's time by those not having the
same beliefs as the Association when the program to be broadcast was
devoted to civic or charitable-rather than religious-purposes. 2
The Commission concluded that "[w]here the facilities of a station
are devoted primarily to one purpose and the station serves as a
mouthpiece for a definite group or organization it cannot be said to be
serving the general public.""' 3 The Commission believed that if one
group were entitled to a station facility for the dissemination of its
principles, other associations would likewise be entitled to station
licenses on the same ground. Since the Commission believed there was
not a sufficient number of broadcast channels to give each group a station license, it declined to grant the license.
The decision in Young Peoples' Association rested on the principle "that the interests of the listening public are paramount to the interests to the individual applicant in determining whether public interest would best be served by granting an application."'' 4 The Commission did not suggest that all religious applicants would be barred, but
focused on the particular proposal of the application which would "extend the use of the station's facilities for religious purposes only to
those whose religious beliefs are in accord with those of the
applicant."'' Relying upon the D.C. Circuit's opinion in KFKB Broadcasting Association v. Federal Radio Commission,"' the Commission
stated that "broadcasting should not be a mere adjunct of a particular
business but should be of a public character.""'
The Commission's concern with specialized formats was carried
over into its 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative BroadcastHearings."' In the Policy Statement the Commission concluded that minor
differences in proposed programming among applicants are apt to prove
to be of no significance,"' but "[s]pecialized proposals necessarily
have to considered on a case-to-case basis."'' . The Commission proposed to "examine the need for the specialized service as against
the need for a general-service station where the question is presented by competing applicants.'
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
6 F.C.C. at 182 (quoting 47 F.2d at 672).
1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 397 n.9.
Id.
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Under the Policy Statement, issues were often sought and occasionally added where an applicant proposed specialized religious programming. Thus, in In Re Harrison Radio, Inc.," 2 the Commission
stated that "[a] full programming comparison is warranted when one
or more applicants propose predominantly specialized programming
and others general market programming. '13 Because one of the applicants in Harrison proposed predominantly religious programming
while the other proposed general market programming, the Commission decided that the programming proposals of the applicants
should be compared under the contingent comparative issue. Additionally, in Harrison the Commission added another issue against a
religious applicant which proposed significant amounts of religious
programming, because the applicant "has not indicated whether it
would provide an opportunity for the expression of views by other,
including non-Christian religious groups and an issue on this matter
will be specified."""
Where a religious applicant proposed predominantly religious
programming, but not to the exclusion of other programming, the
addition of an issue was less likely. Thus in In Re Harvit Broadcasting Corporation,"5 a decision by the Commission's Review
Board," 6 the FCC refused to add an issue where an incumbent
licensee in a comparative renewal proceeding had aired 42 percent
religious programming in the previous license period, and proposed
to devote 37 percent of its broadcasting time during the upcoming
license period to religious programming. The Review Board decided
that the programming was not "specialized." In essence, the religious applicant proposed to offer a wide range of religious programming in lieu of the entertainment programming proposed by other
applicants.' Accordingly, the Review Board declined to add an issue
to permit the program proposals to be compared in an evidentiary
proceeding.
The 1979 decision in In Re George E. Cameron, Jr. Communications"' significantly limits the extent to which specialized programming issues will be a subject of an evidentiary hearing in a compara112. 18 F.C.C.2d 906 (1969).
113. Id. at 908.
114. Id.
115. 18 F.C.C.2d 508 (1969).
116. The Commission's Review Board is an intermediate appellate body between the initial decision maker-the administrative law judge-and the ultimate decision maker in the agency, the full Commission itself.
117. 18 F.C.C.2d at 513.
118. 71 F.C.C.2d 460 (1979).
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tive proceeding. While the decision did not specifically discuss
religious applicants apart from other applicants, the principles that it
laid down for the addition of a specialized programming issue in a comparative proceeding will substantially limit the extent to which program plans of religious broadcasters will provide either an advantage
or a detriment in comparative proceedings.
In George E. Cameron, one of the applicants proposed a specialized format while the others proposed general market programming.
The Commission noted that "[u]nder the practice we have followed
since the 1965 Policy Statement.. . this difference would would have
automatically prompted an inquiry under the standard comparative
issue into the relative need for these formats."'19 In reversing the position in the Policy Statement, the Commission concluded that "[o]n
reexamination, it seems to us that this routine practice has resulted in
12
an unnecessary expediture of resources.""
The Commission was concerned that decisions on the issues of specialized formats tend to be
very subjective and that it is difficult to determine the relative need
for one format over another. Moreover, because a licensee may change
formats at any time without Commission approval, inquiries into the
need for a format had not proved, according to the Commission, to be a
satisfactory ground for a choice between competing applicants. Accordingly, the Commission decided "not to allow inquiry into the
relative need for program formats under the standard comparative
issue, except on a predesignation showing that a proposed specialized
format is not available in the particular market in a substantial
amount. 12
The Harrisoncase dealt with the effort of a competing applicant
to obtain a preference for a specialized format, rather than a
preference for having a general market format in comparison to a
specialized format. However, the principles enunciated by the Commission would also restrict the ease with which comparative programming issues could be added to the detriment of a competing applicant
with specialized programming, such as a religious broadcaster.
Accordingly, it appears that the Commission's policies affecting
religious broadcasters in comparative hearings do not now have a
significant negative impact upon applicants who propose religious formats. Obviously, issues might still arise if it appeared that a broadcast
applicant in a smaller market proposed to use his facility for religious
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
Id.
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programming to the exclusion of other public needs and interests, or if
it appeared that the applicant proposed to limit the views which could
be expressed on his station.
VI.

IMPACT OF RADIO DEREGULATION UPON
RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING

The Commission's recently concluded proceeding on radio
deregulation 2 was a subject of comment by a great number of
religious broadcasters and other religious groups who participated in
the rulemaking, both in support of and in opposition to the Commission's proposed action. A number of the religious groups filing comments with the Commission appeared to have misunderstood the
nature of the Commission's decision and its regulatory background.
Thus, many of the concerns about the effect of radio deregulation on
the availability of religious programming appear to be misplaced.
In its Notice of Inquiry and Notice of ProposedRulemaking 3 the
Commission proposed substantial elimination of rules in four major
areas: (1) guidelines for non-entertainment programming; (2) guidelines
for commercial programming; (3) program log requirements; and (4) ascertainment requirements. In its Report and Order, the Commission
generally adopted the proposals leading to the greatest deregulation.
The decision was based upon the Commission's determination, through
extensive economic and market analysis, that the marketplace-and
not the FCC's regulations-were the best assurance that broadcast
licensees would provide programming to serve the public interest.
A number of non-licensee religious groups questioned the decision to eliminate the commercial guidelines and the nonentertainment guidelines and suggested that their elimination would
foreclose religious programming on commercial stations. Neither of
these guidelines, however, has ever been mandatory upon licensees.
Under the procedures adopted by the Commission for renewal applications, a licensee who met the guidelines for commercial programming
and for non-entertainment programming could have his existing broadcast license renewed at staff level. If the applicant significantly exceeded the commercial guidelines or fell below the percentages in the
non-entertainment programming guidelines, the renewal would be referred to the full Commission for action.

122.
123.

F.C.C.2d
Report and Order, __
44 Fed. Reg. 57,636 (1979).
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As the Commission noted in its Report and Order,some views expressed upon the deregulation proposal "were apparently the result of
some misapprehension or misperception regarding the nature of current Commission requirements and proposals made in the Notice to
alter them. 124 As an example, the Commission stated that:
a great deal of concern was expressed that the elimination
of the non-entertainment programming guideline would
result in the elimination of Commission requirements for
the presentation of public service announcements (PSAs),
religious programs, "sustaining programming," and "com12 5
munity service programming."
Yet, the Commission imposed none of these requirements prior to the
deregulation proceeding. While broadcasters were required to state in
their renewal applications how many PSAs they proposed to broadcast
on a weekly basis in the upcoming license terms, they were not required to propose any. Similarly, the Commission has never required
religious programming, and it is unlikely that the Commission could do
so by general rule without running afoul of the establishment clause of
the First Amendment (although religious programming could be
counted toward meeting the non-entertainment programming
guidelines).
. Likewise, the Commission believed that the concern for presentation of "sustaining programming" was misplaced. "Sustaining programming" is programming which occupies time provided without
charge by the licensees. While the Commission at one time had such a
requirement, the "sustaining programming" requirement was eliminated in 1960, some 20 years prior to the Commission's proposal for
deregulation.126
Based on its study of broadcasters' action in the marketplace, the
Commission determined that most broadcasters would have exceeded
the non-entertainment programming guidelines even if their religious
programming had not been counted. Thus, it appeared that the guidelines themselves were not a significant factor in the decision of many
2
stations to carry religious programming."
Similarly, the Commission
did not believe that the elimination of the programming guidelines
would result in overcommercialization that would drive out meritor124. Report and Order at 13,889.
125. Id.
126. See En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2,303 (1960).
127. Report and Order at 13,890 (1 13).
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ious programming. Based on the economic data collected in the
proceeding, the Commission determined that the amount of advertising aired by most licensees is generally so far below the commercial
guidelines as to demonstrate that factors other than FCC regulations - such as the need to attract listeners - has been responsible for
the amount of commercial matter presented. 8
If the Commission's assessment of the radio marketplace is correct, the decision to deregulate commercial radio should not have a
serious impact upon the availability of religious programming on commercial broadcast stations. Moreover, the elimination of the non-entertainment and commercial guidelines, ascertainment procedures, and
program log requirements may ease the burden which many religious
broadcasters have faced in complying with government regulation.
In addition, the decision may permit a greater degree of specialization and thus reduce the need for religious broadcasters to
address certain community needs and interests which might be more
appropriately handled through co-located broadcast stations with
other formats. The approval of specialization by broadcasters was one
of the underpinnings of the Commission's Report and Order.For example, the Commission stated "[wie do not expect broadcasters to fit their
non-entertainment programming into a mold whereby each station has
the same or similar amounts of programming." " While broadcasters
will be expected to continue to present programming responsive to
public issues, the Commission no longer expects radio broadcasters "to
attempt to be responsive to the particular problems of each group in
the community in their programming. in every instance."'"9 However,
the deregulation order specifically retains the Commission's Fairness
Doctrine requirements, the equal time provisions mandated by
statute,' and the Commission's policy against intentional discrimination in licensees selection of issues to be addressed in their programming. It also recognized that in small communities, where few alternatives are available to listeners, licensees will be expected to be more
broadly based in their programming.
In summary, while the Commission's decision to deregulate
commercial radio is to some degree an experiment, the history of
marketplace action suggests that the decision will not have a substantial impact upon the amount of religious programming presented by
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 13,901 ( 83).
Id. at 13,891 (1 26).
Id. at 13,892 (1 26).
See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
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most commercial broadcasters. Moreover, by specifically recognizing
specialization as a public benefit in many instances, the Commission's
decision may encourage the development of more focused religious formats than have been presented heretofore. Finally, by removing unnecessary regulatory restrictions, the deregulation decision may be of
particular aid to religious broadcasters, many of whom operate on
budgets far smaller than those of other commercial AM and FM stations.
CONCLUSION

The religious broadcaster occupies a unique position that pits him
squarely in conflict with the regulatory authority of the government.
The conscientious religious broadcaster does not acquire a license simply for money, but for far different reasons than the commercial broadcaster. He may seek to entertain, but that is incidental to a foremost
desire to inform. Religion itself may not be controversial- although
some would argue otherwise-but the moral positions that are taken
by various faiths and churches may be extremely controversial, not
only with unbelievers but with other churches as well.
Americans hold to the view that the free competition of ideas in
the marketplace will reveal the truth. The religious broadcaster must
have the right to place these views in the marketplace, unfettered by
unnecessary and excessive governmental regulation that in effect
operates to silence or moderate these voices crying out a message of
hope. Despite the Fairness Doctrine and the various other impediments in the way of the religious broadcaster, he is still getting
the message out. Governmental regulation is not designed to strangle
the religious broadcaster. But because of the religious braodcaster's
unique position, the full weight and authority of governmental review
more often falls his way.
Our Constitution demands that the government maintain a
course of neutraility in religious matters, that it do nothing respecting
the "establishment" of religion and nothing to inhibit "free exercise"
of religion. But where religious belief conflicts with a licensee's responsibilities to operate its station in the public interest, a clear problem,
not faced by secular broadcasters, arises. It is a problem not only for
the religious broadcaster, but for the Commission and courts as well,
as they attempt to steer a course between the often opposing currents
of these two foundational principles of our religious freedom under the
Constitution. For our rights, our liberties, and our faiths to be protected, we must never drop our vigilence. Throughout history
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religious expression has had to struggle with those who would silence
the message, either by design or by thoughtless action and inattention.
History has not changed, and it is the duty and responsibility of every
religious broadcaster, and every member of the religious community,
to man the watchtowers to prevent the otherwise certain erosion of
our religious liberties.
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